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LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM*
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN∗∗
The legal profession in America is passing through a period of anxiety
and self-doubt, an identity crisis of unprecedented proportions. Any
identity crisis has at its center the question, “Who am I?” or “Who are
we?” and begins by unsettling old certainties about the answer. Most of
the time, the majority of us go about our business without worrying too
much about who we are. However, once in a while something happens
that provokes us into a spasm of self-reflection. The entire legal profes-
sion in America seems, these days, to be caught up in a spasm of just this
kind.
The question around which the legal profession’s identity crisis re-
volves could be phrased in terms of the meaning of legal professional-
ism. To ask, “Who are we?” is to ask, “What is the nature of the profes-
sion that we occupy and practice?” Put differently, what is it that makes
the law a profession in the first place?
It is a cliché that ours is a profession and not a trade. We all believe
this. We all badly want to believe it. It is an important thought for us to
hold onto. To say this is, however, to say something merely negative, to
define ourselves by contrast or opposition to something else. But when
one shifts from the negative to the positive, and asks what values and as-
pirations the notion of legal professionalism implies, things become
more difficult.
I would like to briefly examine two different sorts of questions impli-
cated in the current debate about the meaning of legal professionalism.
One I will call the internal question and the other, by contrast, the exter-
nal question.
The internal question concerns the meaning for lawyers themselves of
the work they do. Many lawyers take pride and pleasure in the work they
do. They derive fulfillment from it. Many believe, moreover, that the in-
trinsic fulfillment of the work they do as lawyers is linked to its profes-
sional character. If we concede, for the sake of argument, that the law is
a trade, a business and nothing more—just another way of making
money—many practicing lawyers would, I think, say that such a charac-
terization ignores the very thing that makes their work personally re-
warding for them—its capacity to be intrinsically fulfilling. Of course,
there are many opportunities for fulfillment outside the realm of work,
and many people, most perhaps, don’t look for fulfillment in the work
they do. They look for it after hours, in their family lives, in their per-
sonal relationships, in their hobbies, in the reading they do, or in their
leisure activities. They don’t expect fulfillment in their work. But many
lawyers do, and the anxiety they are experiencing today is the conse-
quence, in part, of their fear that the loss of those qualities that make the
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law a profession may very well deprive law of the power to provide those
in it with the kind of intrinsic fulfillment they seek.
It may eventually happen that the world of work shrinks to a point
where it no longer seems reasonable to look for fulfillment in it. As the
realm of work shrinks and that of leisure grows, the idea that we should
look for the deepest meaning in our lives in the work we do may come to
seem increasingly implausible. Karl Marx believed that the world of
work would eventually wither away, that we would be left with nothing
but free time on our hands, and that we would then have to find fulfill-
ment in our leisure activities.1 But that day has not yet arrived, and until
it does, the demand for meaning in one’s work will continue to be
pressed by lawyers and others.
Where does this demand—the demand that one’s work be intrinsi-
cally satisfying in some deep personal or perhaps even spiritual
sense—come from? The origins of the idea of meaningful work are ob-
scure, but one thing seems clear: It is not an idea first advanced by the
Greeks. Indeed, to the Greeks, the notion that one should look for
meaning in the realm of work would have seemed absurd. Aristotle be-
lieved that freedom begins only where leisure starts. 2 The Greek word for
leisure is scholia, from which we get our English word “school,” among
others. Aristotle identified both the life of the mind and the life of active
citizenship with leisure and relief from work. Work, he thought, was for
slaves: You had to have slaves to do the work that needed to be done, in
order to live a life of leisure and engage in those activities that are genu-
inely meaningful. But the idea that work itself might be intrinsically
meaningful—for Aristotle, this would have seemed a preposterous claim.
I believe that this idea is, at its heart, a Judeo-Christian invention.
Recall the story of The Fall and the expulsion from Paradise.3 In Paradise
there was no work that needed to be done. The fruit ripened and fell on
its own. Adam and Eve lived a life without labor. One of the conse-
quences of their sin and expulsion into the human world of mortality
and labor is that now we must all work in order to live.4 The work we do
is the badge of our spiritual condition as fallen creatures who have dis-
obeyed God and been expelled from Paradise, and every time we get up
in the morning and go to work or wash the dishes at night, the sense of
“fallen-ness” is with us.
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, work thus acquires a spiritual value
it never possessed for the Greeks. To be sure, this was, at first, a negative
value: Work is something to which we have been condemned as a pun-
ishment for sin. But in time, work comes to be viewed in a different light:
as an arena for spiritual progress, for fulfillment, and perhaps even for
redemption. This is an idea that is prominent in the ascetic Protestant
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tradition, as Max Weber and others have pointed out.5 But the idea that
work can be a theater of positive spiritual activity is one that only be-
comes intelligible against the background of the story of The Fall, which,
to begin with, assigns it a negative spiritual meaning.
The notion that work has spiritual value is with us still, although the
scaffolding of religious ideas that accompanied its invention has largely
fallen away. Today, the notion of meaningful work survives mainly in a
secularized form, although the introduction of the factory system, the
rationalization of work, the division of labor, specialization, and all the
other characteristically modern features of the labor process have made
it harder and harder to find in work the kind of spiritual fulfillment for
which the great Protestant ascetics, among others, encouraged us to
look.
There is, however, one branch of the work world, which has been,
until now, relatively immune from these processes of specialization, ra-
tionalization and the like, and that is the branch occupied by the profes-
sions. The professions, and the legal profession in particular, have been
relatively insulated from the pressures of rationalization and specializa-
tion, which have caused the world of work to become an increasingly less
attractive or suitable venue for the pursuit of fulfillment and meaning in
life.
Many people today look for meaning in their lives outside the world
of work. But we professionals hang on to the idea that we can find ful-
fillment in the work we do. We are reluctant to give this idea up, but we
are being forced by events to question whether we can continue to affirm
it. From the internal point of view—from the point of view of the con-
cerns that lawyers themselves have about the work they do and the sat-
isfaction it can offer—from this internal point of view, the crisis of pro-
fessionalism we are now passing through reflects, I believe, a gnawing
doubt that work has become for us, too, an aspect of our lives in which it
is impossible to find the satisfaction for which every human being
yearns. This is a satisfaction that we, like the factory workers Marx de-
scribed a century and a half ago,6 can no longer hope to find in the ac-
tivities by which we make our living.
The current anxiety surrounding the meaning of legal professional-
ism can be understood from two different perspectives. The first, which
I’ve called the internal perspective, emphasizes the growing concern that
lawyers have about the possibility of finding personal fulfillment in their
work. The second, the external, starts with a very different concern—not
whether the demise of legal professionalism has caused lawyers to be
less fulfilled in their work, but whether the qualities or attributes that we
summarize under the rubric of legal professionalism can be connected in
any meaningful way with the good of society as a whole. Do the qualities
of legal professionalism help to promote the welfare of the larger society
                                                                                                                                                
5. See MAX WEBER , THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Par-
sons trans., Scribner 1958) (1930); see also R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE R ISE OF
CAPITALISM (1926).
6. See  1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 255-330 (“The Working Day”); 405-556 (“Machinery and
Modern Industry”) (Modern Library ed. 1906).
4 FL O R I D A  S T  AT E U N I V E RSI T  Y   LA W RE V I E W [Vol. 27:1
we all inhabit? If the answer to that question is yes, then of course every-
one—and not just lawyers—should take an interest in the current crisis
of legal professionalism, for if this crisis is a consequence of the weak-
ening of those elements that make the practice of law a profession, and if
these very elements contribute in some demonstrable way to the good of
society as a whole, then society’s welfare is implicated directly in the
demise of legal professionalism, which should be of concern to us all.
What are these elements? How exactly do they contribute to the wel-
fare of society? I shall mention three aspects of legal professionalism,
which, in my judgment, contribute in a real and measurable way to the
good of society as a whole.
The first of these is the most familiar. It is reflected in the well-known
claim that the law is a public calling. Lawyers are obligated by the oaths
they swear upon admission to the bar to take an interest in the public
good. In everything they do in their professional capacities—in every bit
of advice they give and every litigation they conduct—lawyers are duty-
bound to keep an eye on the public good and to take care that the well-
being of the law is served. What does this familiar idea imply? The easi-
est way to answer this question is to contrast the idea of a public calling
with another idea, the idea of the market, which Adam Smith discovered.
Smith famously described the order of society as the product of a co-
ordinating but invisible hand which weaves the self-centered actions of
countless individuals into an organized whole through the amazing in-
stitution we call a market. At the very beginning of The Wealth of Na-
tions, Smith observes that the baker and the brewer contribute to the
good of society not out of concern for the well being of society itself, but
solely through the pursuit of their own advantage, each looking only to
the profit he hopes to make from the patronage of his customers or cli-
ents.7 Through the coordinating mechanisms of a price system, these
self-centered actions are integrated in a system of remarkable order, in a
market, whose properties Smith was the first systematically to explore.
Today, we live in the age of markets. Our confidence in the ordering
power of markets is nearly boundless. Indeed, the idea of the market is
so powerful that we are forever revising our understanding of all other
human activities in terms of it. Today, there are theories of marriage as a
market, of charity as a market, and of morality as a market. These theo-
ries have the appeal they do because the idea of the market—Adam
Smith’s idea—is one of the most powerful ever discovered.
But there is one fundamental point we must keep in mind as we con-
template the market, and that is that no market can ever be a perfectly
self-regulating system of order. Every market requires framing condi-
tions that stabilize it and protect it against its own pathological excesses.
Even the freest market requires a frame of this sort and cannot exist
without it. Even the freest market requires law, without which economic
life would be ruined by force and fraud, and all authority generated from
the barrel of a gun.
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Law is an essential condition for the existence of a market, and those
who make the law, those who build the house of law, which provides the
necessary stability for any market system, cannot be acting in the same
self-centered way that Adam Smith’s tradesmen do. They must have an
eye out for the good of the whole. They must be directly concerned with
the structure of law that frames the market and cannot rely on the in-
visible hand to produce or sustain it.
I don’t mean to suggest—what of course is not true—that lawyers are
exclusively concerned with the public good. Lawyers have divided alle-
giances. Every lawyer is at one and at the same time the representative of
a particular interest, a particular client, a particular claim, and also an
officer of the court, concerned for the well being of the law as a whole.
Lawyers live in this division of allegiances. It defines the moral experi-
ence of law practice. By contrast, Adam Smith’s brewer and baker have
no divided allegiances. Their only duty—if one wants to call it that—is to
themselves, and through their preoccupation with self-interest comes
the magnificent complexity of a market system.8 But if this system is to
endure, there must be some within it who have a divided allegiance that
causes them to be attentive to the welfare of the system as a whole as
well as to the interests they represent within it. When we say that the law
is a public calling, what we mean to emphasize is the latter allegiance,
which Adam Smith’s brewer and baker, productive though they be, do
not share. Through their public-spirited devotion to the integrity of the
legal system that enframes the market-based and market-driven world
in which we live, lawyers make a crucial contribution to the good of soci-
ety as a whole.
The second and third aspects of the legal profession that have some
connection to the well being of society I shall mention only briefly. One
concerns the relatively unspecialized nature of the work that lawyers do,
and the other their distinctive relation to the past.
Legal education continues to be, to a degree that one might find sur-
prising, generalist in nature. Students come to law school, learn a bit of
this and a bit of that, but don’t really become experts  in anything at all.
Occasionally, one hears complaints about this from the organized bar.
But so far, none of these complaints has caused a significant revision in
the structure of American legal education.
The generalist nature of legal education in fact seems quite appropri-
ate, for the well-trained lawyer must be prepared to move from one
branch of work to another, using broad skills and a general body of
knowledge that is transportable across doctrinal lines. The lawyer’s pro-
fessional wisdom does not consist in the mastery of any technical exper-
tise, but rather in the possession of an ensemble of aptitudes that can be
deployed in virtually any legal matter. These are the qualities of mind
and heart that a good legal education shapes and nourishes.
In the society we inhabit, which is increasingly divided into distinct
and specialized branches of work, the relatively unspecialized nature of
law work is a powerful counterweight to the process of fractionation—of
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division into ever smaller slivers—that is so characteristic of our world.
Moving among the different spheres of social and economic life, with
their distinctive concerns and specialized practices, the lawyer helps to
connect them and to build them into a whole. In this respect, the gener-
alist nature of law practice performs an integrating function much like
the public-spirited attention that lawyers pay to the well-being of the
system of law, which enframes our market economy and gives it its sta-
bility and order.
Finally, I want to say a word about the special relations that lawyers
have to the past. Every activity has a history; every form of work has a
past. But, the relation that lawyers have to their pasts is special. For law-
yers, the past is not just a fact. It is also a value. From the very first day
of law school, lawyers learn to justify their arguments by appealing the
past. For lawyers, the past is a great stockpile of precedents that carry
weight, that have value and force, and to which we defer, not slavishly or
mechanically, but thoughtfully, inventively, creatively. In the law, it is
always an argument that we should continue to do something a certain
way now because it was done that way before. This is not always a com-
pelling argument—often we reject it upon reflection—but it is where dis-
cussion always begins.
The belief that lawyers have in the value of the past also makes an
important contribution to the social order we inhabit. That is because
our world today is characterized by an increasing forgetfulness of the
past. We live in a world of fragmentary moments, of fifteen-minute epi-
sodes, a world that is literally disintegrating in a temporal sense. Against
the obliviousness to the past, the inattention to its weight and value, that
makes our contemporary world at times seem so transient and superfi-
cial, the lawyer’s critical devotion to the past is a counterweight of con-
siderable integrating power.
The qualities of professionalism that I have mentioned—the lawyer’s
concern for the public good, the generalist nature of law training and law
practice, and finally the high value that lawyers attach to the past—each
of these qualities helps to counterbalance the various disintegrating
forces that are constantly threatening to pull our complex world apart.
Most of the wealth and much of the freedom that we enjoy today we owe
to the liberating power of the market, to specialization, and to our giddy
independence from the past. But each of these liberating forces has a de-
structive potential too, and it is against their destructive tendencies that
the qualities I have gathered under the rubric of legal professionalism
provide much-needed balance. That is why the preservation of these
qualities is important not only to lawyers, as they pursue fulfillment in
their work, but to society as a whole, and why everyone—lawyers and
non-lawyers alike—have a stake in their protection.
Our profession is now being remade in the image of the market sys-
tem, a system that itself needs the integrating professionalism of law-
yers. But paradoxically, the more the legal profession is recast in this im-
age, the more it becomes just a business like any other, the more ur-
gently we appreciate the value of the very qualities this “paradigm shift”
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seeks to expunge. Let us resolve to hold on to these qualities as long and
as best we can.
